Does Divine Mystery Lead to Moral Paralysis? The Agency of the Spirit and the Skeptical Theist Response to the Problem of Evil (Part 3)

At this point, two responses have been given in defense of the skeptical theist position, which, as I will argue, are not successful when they are joined with ST 1-3. The first is the argument that it is God’s commands, rather than our competence in the sphere of value assessments, that gives us the ability to act morally. The second is the argument that the skepticism entailed by ST 1-3 should be limited to divine agents rather than human agents.

First Response 

Bergmann and Rea respond by claiming that the skeptical theist need not worry about this objection, for she doesn’t hold ST 1-3 in a vacuum. As a theist, she believes that we have other ways of apprehending our moral obligations than by having a thorough command of goods, evils, and the relations between them. Bergmann and Rea state, “theists very typically believe that God has commanded his creatures to behave in certain ways; and they also very typically believe that God’s commands provide all-things-considered reasons to act.”[1] Thus Bergmann and Rea argue that we do have enough knowledge in the realm of value to recognize what God’s commands are and to follow them. The theist’s full understanding of moral obligations doesn’t come from our contemplation of the realm of values, but what God has revealed to us.

           

This kind of reply, however, does not tell us where God’s commands are to be found and how we might be able to evaluate them. What are we to make of conflicting reports of God’s commands (say, between the Christian Bible and the Koran), or dubious commands that are given, for instance, in the Old Testament? In this manner, Scott Sehon objects that “on the Bergmann and Rea response, we are to do what God tells us to do, rather than reasoning things out on our own; so, we can’t employ our common sense moral reasoning when interpreting what it is that God is telling us. So it will become very difficult to interpret around recalcitrant scriptural passages (e.g., those condoning slavery).”[2] While the common theistic approach to interpreting and interpreting difficult scriptural passages is to appeal to moral reasoning and divine intentions, it doesn’t appear that these are options for the skeptical theist who has endorsed ST 1-3. For if we cannot draw ultimate conclusions about goods, evils, and their relations, we cannot judge which commands apply to us and which ones do not. Stephen Maitzen points out the dilemma which once again confronts the skeptical theist: “Our knowing enough to identify, interpret, and apply God’s commands ought to increase our confidence in drawing the very ‘noseeum’ inferences that skeptical theism is deliberately designed to block.”[3] Thus for the skeptical theist who is committed to ST 1-3, the appeal to divine commands is not sufficient to overturn a pervading moral skepticism.

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[1] Michael Bergmann and Michael Rea, “In Defense of Skeptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005): 244.

[2] Scott Sehon, “The Problem of Evil: Skeptical Theism Leads to Moral Paralysis,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 67 (2010): 77.

[3] Stephen Maitzen, “Skeptical Theism and God’s Commands,” Sophia 47 (2007): 41.