Does Divine Mystery Lead to Moral Paralysis? The Agency of the Spirit and the Skeptical Theist Response to the Problem of Evil (Part 7)

The question to return to, then, is this: Does the knowledge that this framework provides about our moral agency in the Spirit undercut the skeptical theist’s claims to divine mystery that block the noseeum inference (the inference from “we can’t see reasons…” to “there are no reasons…”) found in the evidential argument from evil? I don’t see how it does. For while we understand the Spirit’s role in perfecting creation and our being empowered to co-labor with the Spirit in this mission, this still does not answer the question of why evils happen in the first place. Yet this particular appeal to divine mystery does not leave us morally paralyzed either. For while the Pentecostal skeptical theist will endorse a form of LST and claim that our inability to spot God’s reasons for allowing particular instances of evil is not evidence that no such reasons exist, these considerations do not tell the whole story. The Pentecostal skeptical theist can consistently assert both that there are some divine purposes and intentions beyond our grasp, and that we have been given knowledge of the purposes of divine agency which commission our moral obligations.

For example, let us reflect back on the case of Charles and the child abduction. If Charles is a Pentecostal skeptical theist, he will reason that there may or may not be divine purposes in allowing this particular evil to occur. Charles will, however, have two further considerations that give him an all-things-considered reason to act. First, he is also to consult his general knowledge of values and easily see that the abduction of the child is an evil that should be prevented if he can do so without great risk to himself. His moral agency is not undercut because of a lack of axiological knowledge. Secondly, our protagonist will also recall that he has been called and empowered by the Holy Spirit to join in the mission of alleviating suffering. Further, he recognizes that the Spirit will guide him into all (moral) truth. This gives him a general reason to interfere with the abduction.

While it is still true that there may be divine purposes involved for permitting the child’s abduction, Charles can be confident that preventing the prima facie evil is a part of his moral obligation. This is the case because the possibility of a divine purpose in the midst of an evil act is not sufficient to overthrow the human agent’s general reasons for acting. The Pentecostal skeptical theist is not, therefore, absolutely certain that preventing the abduction is the all-things-considered best action. It always remains possible for God to have a reason for allowing this particular evil. Nevertheless, he can be confident that his interfering the kidnapping is the right action on the grounds that he is participating with the Holy Spirit’s mission to restore a suffering creation.

Therefore, the accusations of moral paralysis that are leveled against this kind of moderated, Pentecostal skeptical theism are not successful. However, they do appear to be decisive against the broad, Bergmannian style of skeptical theism, which seems to forget Paul’s dictum in Romans 12:21: “Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good.”